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I. INTRODUCTION
The development, publicity and availability of new and assisted methods of
human reproduction raise profound ethical, legal and medical concerns. As for
any new medical technology, there is a need for research and experimentation.
At the same time, because human life is involved, there are calls for ethical and
legal evaluations and regulations.
These new technologies have been developed and applied in different
countries, each with different cultures and legal traditions. It is instructive to
compare how different countries respond legally to such new technologies. A
comparison between the United States and United Kingdom is particularly
enlightening because both share a common law heritage and because assisted
reproduction has significant historical roots in England.
I. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Only in the past few years has the Congress of the United States addressed
issues arising from the development of assisted reproductive technologies. The
Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 19922 arose from concerns
over consumer protection and quality control. The Act calls for annual
reporting to the Centers for Disease Control of pregnancy success rates
achieved by assisted reproductive technology programs3 and for the
development of a model program for certifying embryo laboratories.
4
In articulating the reason for the legislation, the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources noted how "[m]edical advancements in the field of
assisted reproductive technologies have significantly improved the likelihood
1Professor of Law, University of Louisville.
242 U.S.C. §§ 263a(1) to (4) (Supp. V 1993).
3 1d. § 263a(1).
41d. § 263a(2).
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of overcoming some infertility problems."5 The Committee recognized the
extent of the problem as infertility was found to affect one in six couples (about
5 million families) who sought infertility services at an expense of over $1
billion in 1990.6
"Assisted reproductive technology" was defined to include "all treatments
or procedures which include the handling of human oocytes or embryos,
including in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer, zygote
intrafallopian transfer" and whatever other methods the Secretary might
include.7 In vitro techniques (TVFs) involve fertilization of an egg in the
laboratory ("in vitro"), while gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT) involves
fertilization in the fallopian tube.8
The following year Congress again addressed infertility issues as part of the
National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993.9 The Act provided for
the creation of research centers with respect to contraception and infertility10
and for research on the transplantation of fetal tissue.11 It was noted in
Congressional hearings that promising research had been threatened and
disrupted by "[u]nreasonable prohibitions" and "unilaterally imposed
obstructions" arising from a fear that research might increase the number or
acceptability of abortions. 12
In explaining the Act, the Committee articulated the relationship between
contraception and infertility.13 While nearly half of the pregnancies in the U.S.
may be unplanned (many due to contraceptive failure), and while half of the
unplanned pregnancies may be terminated by abortion, almost two and one
half million couples find their desire for a child dashed by problems with
infertility.14
While some Congressional action on infertility and the impact of assisted
reproduction techniques has taken place recently, the United States is far
5S. REP. No. 452,102nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2564,
2565.
61d.
742 U.S.C. § 263a(7)(1).
8S. REP. No. 452, supra note 5, at 2.
9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 285g(5), 2 89g(1) to (2) (Supp. V 1993).
1042 U.S.C. § 285g(5)(a).
1142 U.S.C. § 289g(1)(a)(1).
12S. REP. No. 2, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 196,
208-09 (stating that recent administration actions... subvert the principle of freedom
of scientific inquiry .... The peer review system that identifies the most meritorious
research proposals has bee undermined .... The Bush administration ban on fetal
tissue transplantation research was unjustified on scientific, ethical, or humane
grounds.") Id. at 214-15.
1 3 1d. at 212.
141d.
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behind many other comparable countries in addressing such issues.15 The
above mentioned Acts call only for the collection of data and providing
recommendations for regulating research and procedures. Many crucial
questions remain unaddressed.
The reasons for the failure to address issues of human reproduction at the
national level are numerous. One is the volatile issue of abortion. The Reagan
and Bush administrations were elected on anti-abortion platforms. Medical
procedures that could be deemed pro-abortion were forbidden either via
continuing the denial of federal funding for abortion-related procedures or
through executive orders prohibiting such activities. 16
The major change at the federal level with respect to abortion came in 1973
with the decision in Roe v. Wade.17 The importance of that decision for issues
concerning assisted reproduction was the delineation of time periods marking
different governmental interests in the developing fetus. 18 Because mortality
in abortion is less than in normal childbirth up to the end of the first trimester,
during that period the state has no compelling reason to regulate pregnancy.19
Because viability marks the time when the fetus "presumably has the capability
of meaningful life outside the mother's womb," the state has a compelling
interest to protect fetal life.20 After Roe the debate centered around the legal
protection to be given to the nonviable fetus, when such protection should
begin and how the fetus was to be viewed with respect to the pregnant
woman.
2 1
For a time, predictions about the continuing validity of Roe appeared in
media discussions, as nominees for the Supreme Court were quizzed about
their positions on abortion. In 1992 the Court reaffirmed Roe's essential holding
that a pregnant woman could choose whether to continue the pregnancy.
However, the plurality rejected Roe's trimester analysis and recognized the
state's substantial interest, throughout the pregnancy, in potential life.22
The legal semantics and politics of the abortion decisions over more than
twenty years have not altered the volatile nature of the underlying issues. Legal
protection for human life has been a significant part of discussions concerning
1 5 See Pascal Kasimba, Self-regulation and Embryo Experimentation in Australia: A
Critique in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION 169 (Peter Singer et al. eds., 1990); Derek Morgan
& Erwin Bernat, The Reproductive Waltz: The Austrian Act on Procreative Medicine 1992,
1992 J. Soc. WELFARE & FAM. L. 420.
16 See e.g., 28 C.F.R. 551.23 (1986), 42 C.F.R. 59.7-59.10 (1987), 42 C.F.R. 441.202 (1987),
42 C.F.R. 441.206 (1987), 45 C.F.R. 46.204 (1994).
17410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18 d. at 163-65.
19 1d. at 163.
201d.
2 1 See LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
22 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2798-99 (1992).
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assisted reproduction, which may involve fertilization and development
outside the mother's body, termination of fetal life (selective reduction of
multiple pregnancies, research on embryos) and life after birth (foregoing
life-sustaining treatment for newborns).
As Ronald Dworkin suggested some years ago, consensus is unlikely to be
achieved when one side is making arguments of principle while the other side
makes arguments of policy.23 Posed differently, consensus is unlikely when
proponents of a result based upon a utilitarian calculus face
deontologically-based objections. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
reach a consensus while one side attempts to justify or at least tolerate what
the other side finds absolutely unacceptable.
A second hurdle to a federal solution to questions arising from assisted
reproduction lies in the structure of our constitutional form of government. The
articulated powers of the federal government leave many issues to the states,
including family law (definitions of marriage, family, parenthood, legitimacy),
contract (agreements with health care providers, surrogacy contracts), tort
(wrongful birth, wrongful life, prenatal injury), crime (feticide) and regulation
of health and medical procedures under the police power.24 Historically, the
federal government has not attempted to impose uniformity among the states
on such matters.
Uniformity is imposed, however, when the issue is resolved on the basis of
constitutional rights derived from the Federal Constitution, which was the
avenue taken in Roe v. Wade.25 One major source of disagreement within the
Roe v. Wade decision was the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution
so as to preclude any state options for different solutions.26 In recent years more
and more of family law has been constitutionalized in decisions based upon
rights. Family relationships, however, do not lend themselves to resolution in
terms of dichotomous assertions of rights: parent-child, mother-fetus,
father-mother-child. So also at the state level, efforts to resolve the issues by
discovering rights in state constitutional language would remove the matter
from legislative action. Yet the recent history of civil rights efforts, whether on
the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, abilities, or age lends credibility to
claims of rights and motivates those promoting a claim based on rights.
23RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-83 (1977) [hereinafter TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY]. Later, he would distinguish further between derivative claims (that
the fetus already has rights from conception) and detached claims (that from conception
a fetus embodies a form of human life which is sacred). RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
11-13, 19-22 (1993) [hereinafter LIFE'S DOMINION].
24This is consistant with the mandate that "the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people." US. CONST. amend. X.
25 See 410 U.S. at 147.
261d. at 152-53.
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The abortion controversies have also revealed the limitations of claims based
on rights. The convoluted controversies over constitutional interpretation
show that disagreements on basic issues are not resolved on the basis of textual
exegesis or historical practice or philosophical analysis. Such arguments
simply add another dimension to the breadth and intensity of the
disagreements. For now the two sides differ not only over the underlying
substantive issue but also over methodological principles for resolving the
issue. The absence of a basic moral consensus becomes more apparent. The
United States once took pride in being a melting pot (e pluribus unum) with a
centripetal moral-religious outlook. That underlying and unifying consensus
has itself come under recent attack in the name of pluralism, diversity and
recognition of difference.
Ill. LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
It proves enlightening to compare the experience of legislation of assisted
reproductive technology in the United States with that in the United Kingdom.
There are significant differences both at the level of method (how decisions are
arrived at) and in the content of the decisions (what is decided). Obviously the
two are related for how one makes a decision will shape the outcome.
The experience in the United Kingdom is especially helpful because one can
exactly date the eruption of public discussions. That date is July 25,1978, when
Louise Brown was delivered by Caesarian section in the Oldham and General
District hospital in Lancashire.27 Research and experimentation had been
taking place for some time, but the birth of the first baby whose conception had
been assisted artificially focused attention on what was no longer science
fiction or dream but a lovely 5 lb. 12 oz. baby girl.28 Yet even as the participants
rejoiced in the success of their efforts, questions were raised which would
dominate future debate.
Louise Brown was her parents' daughter in every sense of the word. She
developed from her father's sperm, her mother's egg, and within her mother's
body, from which she was born. 29 Her mother and father were married and
2 7 ROBERT EDWARDS, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: REFLECTIONS ON THE EMBRYO DEBATE 2 (1989).
Robert Edwards, Professor of Human Reproduction at Cambridge, along with
gynecologist Patrick Steptoe, assisted in the conception of Louise. Not only does the
author describe the years of effort which went into the birth of the first "test-tube baby,"
he also states a basic thesis of scientists and physicians working in the area of assisted
reproduction (in response to a claim that they are "creating life" or "playing God"):
Nobody can create human life artificially, not in a test-tube, a Petri dish,
or anywhere else. Such claims are ridiculous, pathetically arrogant. Life
is uniquely there, bursting out everywhere, a wonderful part of our
universe. The most that any of us can do is to help make life possible, and
to make it healthy and good.
Id.
28Id.
29 See id. at 1-2.
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their intention to have a child motivated their participation in a program with
those who provided expertise in assisted reproduction.3 At the same time, it
was apparent that different persons could function as gestational parent: sperm
donor, egg donor, or embryo donor; gestational parent: the woman who carries
and gives birth to a child; and intending parent(s): those who hope to raise the
child. Some or none of these individuals may be legally married to one another
and one or more could be married to a non-participant. The possibility and
probability of stimulated ovulation producing many eggs whose fertilization
in vitro could produce several embryos raised further questions. Possibilities
became even more numerous with the use of cryopreservation to freeze sperm
and embryos for future use. Publicized success in one case increases demand
from others such as infertile persons seeking to become parents, from
physicians treating infertility, and scientists wishing to do research to produce
further successes.
The birth of Louise Brown was the first of many from assisted reproduction.
Edwards and Steptoe opened their own clinic, Bourn Hall, which had five
test-tube babies and sixty pregnancies by 1981. The first child born in Australia
through such technology was born in 1980. Similar technology was
successfully employed in Europe, the United States, China, the Middle East,
Africa and South America.31
The growth and success of the new technologies prompted calls for
investigation and regulation. While some remembered Mary Wollstonecraft
Shelley, Aldous Huxley, George Orwell and the excesses of so-called eugenic
experimentation by Nazi doctors,32 others were anxious about the intrusion of
medical technology into the most intimate recesses of human life and human
relationships.33
Committees to study the ethical, legal, social and political dimensions of the
new reproductive technologies were set up by churches, 34 medical societies,
and activist groups either supporting or opposing the use of the new
technologies. In July, 1982, the Government's Secretary of State for Social
Services announced the establishment of a sixteen member committee of
inquiry, composed of theologians, social workers, attorneys, and scientists,
30EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 1-2.
3 1 See EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 16-19.
3 2 MARY WALLSTONECRAFT SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (1976); ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE
NEW WORLD (1932); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1961). See GoTz ALY ET AL., CLEANSING THE
FATHERLAND-NAzi MEDICINE AND RACIAL HYGIENE (1994); BENNO MULLER-HILL,
MURDEROUS SCIENCE: ELIMINATION BY SCIENTIFIC SELECTION OF JEWS, GYPSIES, AND
OTHERS, GERMANY 1933-1945 (1988).
3 3 RICHARD MCCORMICK, How BRAVE ANEW WORLD?: DILEMNAS IN BIOETHICS, ch. 16
(1985)
34 See, e.g., for example, the Church of Englands' report, Personal Origins, and the
Roman Catholic document, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the
Dignity of Procreation.
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under the chairmanship of the philosopher Dame, now Lady Mary Warnock,
Mistress of Girton College, Cambridge.35
The Warnock Report was presented on June 26,1984, after two years of work
by the committee.3 6 Before addressing specific issues, the Committee
recognized the problem of relating legislation and morality in such
controversial areas as human life.37 It was accepted without argument that
birth, death, and establishing a family were morally significant issues.38 It was
also accepted that such issues with respect to embryos and assisted
reproduction were not determinable by rules, for none existed about such
issues, nor by arguments from utility, for these required prior judgments about
the status of the embryo.39 With respect to law and morals, the Committee
referred to the distinction offered by H.L.A. Hart in Law, Liberty and Morality
between a primary moral problem or first level (is some action right or wrong)
and a critical moral problem or second level (if law were to intervene, would
the infringement of liberty be right or wrong).40
The Committee then adopted its basic position with respect to the human
embryo. The question was not whether the embryo was alive or human, or
whether, if implanted, it might eventually become a full human being.41 The
Committee stated the following:
We argued that in practical terms a collection of four or sixteen cells
was so different from a full human being . . . that it might quite
legitimately be treated differently. Specifically, we argued that unlike
a full human being it might legitimately be used as a means to an end
that was good for humans, both now and in the future .... This is a
moral judgment, with focus not on potentiality but on actuality, on
what the embryo was at a particular time.
42
35 EDWARDS, supra note 27, at 113. In commenting upon the Wamock Report, Simon
Lee reflected: "At its worst the Warnock Report was the product of the wrong people
considering the wrong issues in the wrong way. At its best it provides pointers to good
medical law, ethics and practice." Simon Lee, Rereading Warnock, in RIGHTS AND WRONGS
IN MEDICINE, 37 - (Peter Byrne, ed. 1986). He noted the absence of physicians and
scientists who were in vitro researchers and lawyers and ethicists who specialized in
reproductive medicine; yet he recognized the need for some permanentbody to monitor
the area and to issue codes of practice. Id.
3 6 MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LiFE-THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1985).
3 7 1d. at xii-xvii.
3 8 1d. at viii.
3 9 1d. at ix-x.
40WARNOCK, supra note 36, at xi.
4 l1d. at xii.
4 2 1d. at xiv-xv. In its conclusion, the Committee returned to these issues, noting that
matters of life and death, birth and family are central to morality, where persons have
a right to make judgments for themselves (such is the Protestant tradition which runs
1994-95]
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The Committee recognized that the public strongly supported the value of the
absolute sanctity of human life from the earliest stage of development.43 It also
recognized that the public strongly supported advancements in scientific and
medical knowledge for the treatment of infertility and the creation and
application of knowledge for prenatal diagnosis and treatment.44
The Committee made a second moral judgment in determining eligibility
for assisted reproduction. It concluded that heterosexual couples living
together in a stable relationship should be eligible for treatment.4 5 The
Committee did consider single parents, but concluded that it was generally
better for children to be born into a two-parent family with both a mother and
a father.4 6 It was less important that the couple be married to one another.47
This judgment was based in part upon the European Convention on Human
Rights which provides in Article 8: "Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life" and in Article 12: "Men and women of marriageable
age have the right to marry and to found a family."48
The Committee made specific recommendations about the different
technologies. The Warnock Report's recommendations proved to be quite
influential when subsequent discussions and legislation incorporated them.
This is especially true of the basic structure of a licensing authority to authorize
and regulate personnel and clinics offering assisted reproduction.
Artificial insemination (using semen either from the woman's husband or
from a donor) was found to have become morally acceptable within society.
The recommendation was that it be licensed with the following restrictions: the
couple should be counselled and give their consent in writing, the semen donor
should have no parental rights or duties with respect to the child, any third
party donor's identity should be unknown to the couple although at age
eighteen a child should have access to the donor's ethnic, genetic and health
information, and no more than ten children should be fathered by any one
donor's semen.49 The Committee less strongly recommended that semen not
be used after the donor's death, even if the semen was from the mother's
husband.50
deep in this country). Moral "experts" would be impossible where there is not only one
right or possible answer. The Committee's advantages are its time for reflection and its
ability to have staff develop facts and information. Id. at 96-97.
4 3 1d. at 99.
44 WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 99.
4 51d. at 10.
461d. at 11.
47Id. at 11-12.
4 8 BASIC DOcumENTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS 246-47 (lan Brownlie, ed., 2nd ed. 1981).
4 9 WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 82.
501d. at 23-27.
[Vol. 9:135
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION
Similar approval and restrictions were made concerning egg donation, for it
seemed illogical to accept semen donation but not egg donation. However, the
woman giving birth should be regarded for all legal purposes as the mother
and not the egg donor.51 In vitro fertilization should be licensed and available
and included within the National Health Service offerings.52 Surrogacy,
however, was found to be quite unacceptable, for by introducing a third party
it attacked the marital relationship and allowing payment for giving up a child
disturbs the mother and child relationship. 53 Thus, the Committee
recommended that commercial surrogacy not only be outlawed but be made a
crime.54 Non-commercial surrogacy for convenience alone (where the woman
is physically capable of bearing a child) is totally unacceptable. The risk of
exploitation of the mother outweighs the potential benefits in almost all other
cases. If non-commercial surrogacy takes place, however, the carrying woman
is the mother and perhaps the adoption laws should be made more flexible to
allow the genetic mother to adopt.55
The Committee recommended that freezing semen or embryos was
acceptable and should be licensed. As it was not yet practicable to freeze eggs,
that procedure was not be done until research proved it could be performed
without harm to the fetus.56 There should be regular five-year reviews of frozen
semen and embryos and a maximum of ten years of frozen storage.57 Where
one of a couple dies, the right to use or dispose passes to the survivor, although
a widow should be discouraged from using semen after the donor's death.5 8
Where the donor cannot be found or where both donors die, the decision passes
to the storage authority which should bear in mind the donor's previously
expressed wishes.59 The donors have no legal rights or duties to children born
from donated gametes. 60 A child who was not in utero at its father's death
should be disregarded for all purposes of inheritance and succession.61 Among
multiple births, the first-born is the oldest and for primogeniture, the time of
birth, not of fertilization, should be determinative. 62
5 id. at 35-37.
521d. at 32.
53 WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 44-45.
54 d. at 46.
55 d. at 42-47.
56 d. at 81.
57 WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 53-55.
581d. at 55.
591d. 56-57.
60 d. at 25.
61WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 55.
621d. at 53-57.
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The Committee was created not only to make recommendations concerning
the provision of treatment for the infertile via artificial insemination, in vitro
fertilization, egg donation and embryo transfer, but also to study research.
Research goals included better understanding of fetal development, improved
methods of contraception and alleviation of infertility, and prenatal care and
therapy.63 The Committee summarized current biological evidence concerning
human development from fertilization through cell divisions to
implantation.64 It determined that the time to be adopted for purposes of
regulating research on embryos was the appearance of the primitive streak at
about 14 or 15 days.65 Because this was regarded as the beginning of individual
development, no research should be allowed beyond this time. The Committee
acknowledged: "Although questions of when life or personhood begin appear
to be questions of fact susceptible to straightforward answers, we hold that the
answers to such questions in fact are complex amalgams of factual and moral
ingredients."66
Commentators noted that the Committee had stated conclusions without
providing supporting argumentation concerning the origins of human life.6 7
"Ultimately, however, as in the context of abortion, the status of the embryo
would remain an elusive concept, secreted in the interstices of the legal regime,
but not declared." 68
R. M. Hare claimed that the Wamock Committee failed to present reasons
regarding both sides of the debate, or to determine which reasons were
sufficient and why. Hare contends that these failures occurred because it was
easier for the Committee to agree upon recommendations than upon reasons
therefor and because Mary Wamock philosophically accepted the position that
reactions of people (including obviously members of her Committee) are data
upon which one can base moral conceptions. 69 Criticism aside, Hare
recognized Wamock's contribution by stating that he would have awarded her
a "place in the philosophical Hall of Fame" for getting into a public document
the notion that the issue was normative. 70
6 31d. at 58-62.
64Id. at 58-59.
6 5 WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 59.
6 6 Id. at 60.
67Jacqueline A. Priest, The Report of the Warnock Committee on Human Fertilization and
Embryology, 48 MOD. L. REV. 73, 74 (1985).
68Id. at 75.
6 9 R. M. Hare, Public Policy in a Pluralist Society, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION, supra
note 15, at 183, 188-89.
70R. M. Hare, In Vitro Fertilization and the Warnock Report, in ETHICS, REPRODUCTION
AND GENETIC CONTROL 71, 87 (Ruth E. Chadwick ed., 1987).
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Instead of trying to answer these questions [of when life or personhood
begin] directly we have therefore gone straight to the question of how
it is right to treat the human embryo. We have considered what status
ought to be accorded to the human embryo, and the answer we give
must necessarily be in terms of ethical or moral principles.
71
It is difficult to point to a specific moment of origin, for, as Stephen Buckle
notes, we use the same terminology for what can be an event or a process (e.g.
fertilization, conception, implantation) depending upon one's time perspective
within the continuum of human embryonic development. 72 There remains,
however, the necessity of selecting marker events to designate morally different
parts of the continuum. 73
The Wamock Report's call for legislation was not answered until 1990. In the
meantime, further reports and studies were presented, including the Church
of England's report on assisted reproduction, Personal Origins (1985), the
Government's consultation document, Legislation on Human Fertility Services
and Embryo Research (1986), and the White Paper Human Fertilization and
Embryology: A Framework for Legislation (1987). At the same time, members of
Parliament introduced private members' bills and the Unborn Children
(Protection) Bill, which would have the effect of limiting the creation, storage
and use of embryos to bringing forth a specific child.74
In November, 1990, the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990
[HFEA] was enacted.75 The Act created the statutory licensing authority
recommended by so many voices, the Human Fertilization and Embryology
Authority.76 It is crucial to note from the outset that the HFEA is a beginning
and not the last word on assisted reproduction. It represents "a marshalling of
arguments after nearly two decades of scientific research and ethical and
philosophical debate," "just the starting point," and "a transitory marker in
continued moral reflection."77
7 1 WARNOCK, supra note 36, at 66.
72Stephen Buckle, Biological Process and Moral Events, in EMBRYO EXPERIMENTATION,
supra note 15, at 193, 197-99.
731d. at 198-99.
74 See Suprise Bill, 15 FAM. L. 145 (1985); see also Embryo Concerns, 17 FAM. L. 112 (1987).
75Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37 (Eng.) [hereinafter -IFEA].
The lengthy act has 49 sections and runs fifty pages with its four schedules. The
administrative arrangements for the HFEA and § 36 concerning surrogacy were brought
into force on 7 November 1990 by the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act
(Commencement No. 1) Order (SI No. 2165/1990). Gillian Douglas, Human Fertilization
and Embryology Act 1990 21 FAM. L. 110 (1991). 1 August 1991 was the date all other
provisions of the HFEA 1990 not already in force, became effective, except § 30 (parental
orders), which came into force on 14 October 1991. Id. 350.
76f4A at § 50.
77DEI EK MORGAN & ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN
FERTILIZATION & EMBRYOLOGY AcT 1990 1, 3 (1991) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE].
1994-95]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
The HFEA is to provide structure and direction to the persons and places
involved in providing and utilizing assisted reproduction technologies. The
Authority shall annually submit a report on its activities to the Secretary of
State, who shall lay it before each House of Parliament.78 The Authority shall
also gather information about embryos and treatment services which it shall
provide to the government and to persons licensed or seeking treatment.79
The major effect of the HFEA is the licensing of persons and premises
involved with reproductive technologies covered by the Act. Licenses may be
granted for providing treatment services, for storage of gametes and embryos,
and for research thereon. 80 The license committee, to be established by the
Authority, shall determine that each applicant is a "suitable person to hold a
license" and has the "character, qualifications and experience" to provide
treatment and to assure that provisions of the HFEA are satisfied.81 Before
granting a license the premises shall be inspected and reinspections shall take
place annually.82 A license may also be refused or revoked.83 Finally, the
Authority shall maintain a Code of Practice concerning activities carried on
under the license.84
The area of assisted reproductive technology covered by the HFEA is thus
brought under continuing public scrutiny and evaluation. The Act guarantees
that the government and the Parliament will have regular and current
information on what is being done, where and by whom, and on the results
achieved. Public representation is assured as more than half the members of
the Authority shall not be physicians, persons keeping or using gametes or
embryos, or persons directly concerned with research thereon.85 Members of
those three groups are also excluded from holding the positions of chairman
or deputy chairman. 86 Membership shall also include the views of both men
and women.87
In determining what activities should be included under the HFEA and what
limitations should be placed upon the power of the Authority to grant licenses,
"Believing that such fundamental moral and legal issues can be 'solved' betrays a
misunderstanding of what moral disagreement is about, as much as it does about the
political process of legislating life or regulating reproduction." Id. at 1.
78-IFEA §§ 6-7.
79Id. at § 8(a)-(c).
80 Id. at § 11.
81HFEA § 16.
821d. at § 9(7)-(11).
831d. at §§ 18-19.
84 HFEA § 25.
85 HFEA sched. 1 § 4(2)-(4).
861d. at sched. 1 § 4(3).
871d. at sched. 1 § 4(2).
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Parliament gave expression to the social limits which would circumscribe
current practices in assisted reproductive technologies. The HFEA established
not only the structure of regulation but also the content by defining the
technologies to be licensed, the legal status of children produced thereby, and
boundaries beyond which treatment and research must not venture.
The HFEA sets limits first by defining 'embryo' to mean "a live human
embryo where fertilization is complete" and references to any embryo include
"an egg in the process of fertilization."88 The Act includes only embryos created
outside the human body or kept and used outside the human body.89
Expressly forbidden are efforts to create hybrids or to engage in trans-species
fertilization by placing in a woman any live embryo other than a human
embryo or any live gametes other than human gametes or by placing an
embryo [human] in an animal.90 Cloning is also forbidden ("replacing a nucleus
of a cell of an embryo with a nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo
... ").91
The influence of the Warnock Report is evident in the prohibition of keeping
or using an embryo after the appearance of the primitive streak, which is
statutorily presumed to have appeared "not later than the end of the period of
14 days beginning with the day when the gametes are mixed, not counting time
during which the embryo is stored.' 92
Around the 14th day after fertilization, if the cells have met no other
unfavorable conditions in the uterus the inner cell mass which has
differentiated initially into a two layered disc composed of endoderm
and ectoderm, produces a third layer (the mesoderm). This third layer
has become interposed between the ectoderm and the endoderm by a
process of invagination from the ectoderm. The site of the invagination
can be seen as a line called the primitive streak on the ectodermal
surface of the bilaminar disc. It is the development of this groove on
which the Wamock Report fixed as the crucial transformation when
the rubicon is crossed between molecular matter and potential human
being. To this molecular matter scientists later gave the appellation
"pre-embryo.'93
881d. § l(1)(a)-(b). Fertilization is not considered complete "until the appearance of a
two cell zygote." IFEA § 1(1)(b).
891-IFEA § 1(2)-(3).
90!d. at § 3(2)(a)-(b), 3(b).
911d. at § 3(3)(d).
921d. § 3(3)(a), (4).
93BLAcKsTON's GUIDE, supra note 77, at 68. "[U]ntil the 14th day cells are
pluripotential and until the appearance of the primitive streak it is not known whether
they will develop into an hydatiform mole, into twins, into one embryo, or degenerate
into nothing. It is on this basis that the 14th day is said to be important." Id. at 71. The
14 day time limit had also been adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe in Recommendation 1046 "[o]n the use of human embryos and foetuses for
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The significance of the 14-day point was highlighted in Parliament by John
Hapgood, the Archbishop of York:
What is happening embryologically is the creation of persons through
a process, which although it begins with genetic union, is not simply
about a union of genes but also depends on a certain cellular identity
which only becomes apparent at the time of the appearance of the
primitive streak.
94
As a biologist himself, Hapgood noted how scientists work with gradualism
and study incremental changes both at the level of evolution and of individual
development.95 He found such a view compatible with the theological view
that God continuously calls personal being into existence (continuous creation
rather than infusion of a human soul at a specific moment).96 He proposed that
we use a neutral term to describe the result of fertilization up to implantation:
'conceptus' is "an organism of human origin which given the right conditions
has the potential to develop and may become a full human person."97
Parliament, in adopting the IFEA, selected another point in the process of
development as legally significant when it modified the Abortion Act 1967 to
provide that abortion is allowed when "the pregnancy has not exceeded its
twenty-fourth week."98 The twenty-fourth week would be substituted for the
28th week, which the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 had established as the
statutory presumption for the time when a child was "capable of being born
alive".99
diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes." Parlimentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 38th Ordinary Session, Recommendation 1046 at 4
(1986).
Scientists disagree about exactly when the biological life of any animal
begins, but it seems undeniable that a human embryo is an identi-
fiable living organism at least by the time it is implanted in a womb,
which is approximately fourteen days after its conception.
LIFE'S DOMINION, supra note 23 at 21. For a critique of the 14 day rule, which he calls
"entirely arbitrary, no stronger ethically or medically than any other," see EDWARDS, supra
note 27, at 171-73.
9 4 BLAcKSTONE'S GUIDE at 77 (quoting __ Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 956 (1990).
95Joseph M. Jacob, Annotation, Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990, (8)-6
CURRENT LAW STATUTES ANNOTATED 37-1, 37-6 (1990).
961d. at 37-6 - 37-7.
9 7 1d. at 37-7 - 37-8.
98 HFEA § 37(1)(a).
99See BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE, supra note 77, at 40-55 for a discussion of the complex
interrelationships of the Act of 1803, Lord Ellenborough's Act, which criminalized
abortion of a quick fetus (about 16-18 weeks), the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861
which allowed abortion only to save the mother's life, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act
1929, R v. Bourne, 1 KB 687 (1939), the Abortion Act 1967, and two recent cases in which
the court attempted to define "capable of being born alive": C v. S, 1 All ER 1230 (1987)
and Rance v. Mid Downs Health Authority, 140 NLJ 325 (1990). See also James E. S.
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In addition to limiting the scope of the HFEA by defining time limits,
coverage is also restricted with respect to procedures and persons who receive
them. The Act covers only the creation of an embryo outside the human
body.100 It also includes only donated sperm and/or eggs.lOl Because
providing treatment services with the use of donated sperm or eggs is to be
done only by one with a license therefor102 and "treatment services" are
provided to the public, 103 the Act does not cover a woman who attempts
do-it-yourself artificial insemination or who seeks to become pregnant with the
help of a man recruited for that purpose. It also does not cover artificial
insemination of a woman with the sperm of her husband or partner.104 At the
present time it does not appear possible for nonprofessionals to retrieve and
make use of donated eggs.
There was debate about the inclusion of GIFT (gamete intrafallopian
transfer) when it involved the use of donated gametes. The Act adopted a
compromise, whereby placing sperm or eggs into a woman may be subject to
regulations1 05 with further guidance to be given by the Code of Practice.106
Morgan and Lee suggest that the Government succumbed to pressure from the
medical community in excluding GIFT, which they believe should be included
because it is similar to various covered procedures, including retrieval of eggs,
creation and manipulation of an embryo and multiple pregnancies. Moreover,
similar risks exist to the woman and fetus in each procedure. 107
The Act adopted another compromise concerning the persons who may
receive treatments. As a condition to a license granted under the Act,
[a] woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born
Fortin, Legal Protection for the Unborn Child, 51 MOD. L. REv., 54 (1988); Jonathan
Montgomery, Rights, Restraints and Pragmatism: the HFEA 1990, 54 MOD. L. REv. 531
(1991); DOUGLAS, supra note 75, at 115-16, and, concerning C v. S, 17 FAM. L. 148 (1987).
100HFEA § 1(2).
1011d. § 4.
1021d. §§ 4(1)(a), (b).
103HFEA § 2(1).
10 4 BLAcKsroNE's GUIDE, supra note 77, at 118.
105 HFEA §§ 4(3), (4).
1061d. § 25(3).
107BLAcKsToNE's GUIDE, supra note 77, at 124-34. They indicate that the GIFT
procedure is covered by common law doctrines of informed consent and negligence. It
was also suggested that GIFT was excluded because the Government wanted to avoid
regulating the superovulatory drugs themselves. Derek Morgan, Assis ted Conception and
Clinical Practice: Whose Freedom Is It? 1990 NEw L. J. 600, (1990).
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as a result of the treatment (including the need of that child for a father),
and of any other child who may be affected by the birth.
1 °8
Treatment services were not forbidden to single women; however, the provider
must evaluate the impact upon the child of being raised by a single parent.
There is also reference to the child's need for a father, which suggests a
heterosexual couple. The couple's being married to one another is not made a
condition for service. Account must not only be taken of the welfare of the child
to be conceived but also how such child may affect other children. The most
obvious reference would be to siblings or half siblings.
Morgan and Lee once again traced the impact of the Warnock Report, which
had taken a similar position:
[mI]any believe that the interests of the child dictate that it should be
born into a home where there is a loving, stable, heterosexual
relationship and that, therefore, the deliberate creation of a child for a
woman who is not a partner in such a relationship is morally wrong
... we believe that as a general rule it is better for children to be born
into a two-parent family, with both father and mother, although we
recognise [sic] that it is impossible to predict with any certainty how
lasting such a relationship will be.
109
They note the statement by Lord Mackay, the Lord Chancellor, that the Act was
consistent with the Government's stress upon "family values,"110 and
concluded that the Act was premised upon "a profamilist ideology" under
which treatment services would be provided "for the married, mortgaged
middle-classes" and was consistent with the current practice of not providing
infertility services under the National Health Service. 111 Those seeking
treatment services would be evaluated for their "fitness to parent" and the Act
provided in its "conscience clause" that anyone with "a conscientious objection
to participating in any activity governed by this Act" was under no duty to do
so.112 Morgan and Lee indicated that there is very little evidence that would
support negative conclusions concerning single or lesbian couple [or
homosexual couple] parenting, or even about children in "fatherless families"
if one factors in poverty and welfare policies.113
108 IFEA § 13(5). The Authority is directed to maintain a Code of Practice which "shall
include guidance for those providing treatment services about the account to be taken
of the welfare of children who may be born as a result of treatment services (including
a child's need for a father), and of other children who may be affected by such births."
Id. at § 25(2).
1 0 9 BLAcKsToN-'s GUIDE, supra note 77, at 141 (citing Wamock Report para. 2.11).
11OId. at 143.
11d. at 143, 146.
12I-IFEA § 38(1).
113 BLAcKSTONE's GUIDE, supra note 77, at 147-48.
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Furthermore, the Act contains detailed requirements concerning consent,
counselling and information to be provided. It is made a condition for a license
that no woman shall be provided treatment involving the use of donated
gametes without the donor's consent, or the use of an embryo taken from a
woman (by lavage) without such woman's consent "unless the woman being
treated and, where she is being treated together with a man, the man have been
given a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling about the
implications of taking the proposed steps, and have been provided with such
relevant information as is proper."114
Schedule 3 of HFEA includes detailed requirements for consent, and
conditions the provision of treatment services upon prior consent. Thus,
donated gametes may not be used to treat others without the effective consent
of the donor.115 Furthermore, donated gametes may not be used to create an
embryo in vitro without consent of the donors to the use of the embryo for the
donors, for others, or for research.116 Finally, gametes and embryos may not be
stored without the consent of the donors, and such consent shall also provide
what should happen if the one giving consent dies or becomes incompetent.117
Consent must be obtained in writing and may be revoked or varied 118 up to
the time the embryo is used for treatment services or research.
In order for the consent to be legally effective, the one giving consent must
have adequate knowledge (informed consent). As in consent for other medical
procedures, the information must include the risks and benefits of various
treatment options (e.g. some treatment options may involve several embryos
with the risks associated with higher order pregnancies), their likelihood of
success (especially after one or more treatments have not been successful), and
the alternatives to treatment (with respect to parenting, e.g., adoption,
foster-parenting).1 9 Counselling is required both before treatment in
recognition that the experience of infertility may produce guilt, bewilderment,
anger and dysfunction in personal and marital relationships, and during
treatment, as people experience the financial and emotional burdens of
continuing treatments after repeated failures. 120
Another area about which persons asked to consent must be informed is the
disclosure of information that an individual born via assisted reproduction
1141-IFEA § 13(6).
115HFEA sched. 3 § 2.
11 6 1d.
1171d.
118HFEA sched. 3 para. 1. Such revocation or variation can occur up to the time the
embryo is used for treatment services or research. Id.
ll9 BLACKSTONE's GUIDE, supra note 77, at 128-29, 131-32.
12 0 d. at 16-17, 150-51.
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services can receive.121 Licensees for treatment services, storage or research
must maintain a register of who receives services, what services were provided,
whose gametes were kept or used, the children who appear to have been born
as a result of treatment, and any mixing of egg and sperm or taking of an
embryo from a woman.122 An individual, upon reaching the age of eighteen,
may require the Authority to comply with a request for information if the
register shows such applicant "was or may have been... born in consequence
of treatment services."123 The applicant may request to know whether a person
other than a parent would or might be a parent of the applicant and whether
the applicant and one whom the applicant intends to marry are related.124
Information concerning potential marriage partners may be received even by
an applicant who is not eighteen. 125 The applicant is not to receive information
about "the identity of a person whose gametes have been used or from whom
an embryo has been taken" provided such information could not then have
been required from the Authority.126 Commentators note that the protection of
donor anonymity is limited to statutory requirements, which of course could
be amended at any time (and where there isno information about children born
after treatment services, HFEA section 24(1) requires the information to be
retained for fifty years).127
121H-EA sched. 3, 3(1(b)). Person giving consent must be provided "relevant
information" which would include the donor's identity and expectations of anonymity.
1221d. §§ 13(2)(a)-(e).
1231d. at § 31(3)(a).
124 1d. at § 31(4).
125 HEFEA § 31(6). The reason for providing information about the relationship of an
individual and a proposed marriage partner is obviously to avoid the possibility of
incestuous marriages. To reduce the number of possibly incestuous marriages (as well
as for genetic concerns) the Wamock Reportwould limit the number of births from one
semen donor to ten. The HFEA did not limit the number of births from one donor,
although the Authority could provide such guidance in its Code of Practice. It would
be in the interest of children to be born as a result of treatment services not to have too
many half siblings which could increase the risk of biologically incestuous marriages.
126 HFEA § 31(5).
127BLAcKSTONEs'S GUIDE, supra note 77, at 162. Morgan and Lee suggest that Gaskin v.
United Kingdom, 1 FLR 167 (1990), may be significant. In that case the European Court
of Human Rights held that art. 8 of the European Convention (respect for private and
family life) required that certain information about an individual's treatment while in
care under § 1 of the Children Act 1948 be made available to an adult. It cited the
Commission to the effect that "respect for private life ... requires that 'everyone should
be able to establish details of their identity as individual human beings" but also noted
that confidentiality was necessary to protect third persons, especially when pledges of
confidentiality had been given. Thus an independent authority should decide which
information should be released. Id. at 180. However, in In Re G (A Minor)(Blood Test),
1 FLR 495 (1994), the Family Court while recognizing that human relationships are best
founded upon the truth and that it is in the child's interests to resolve doubt and to "deal
with it now," also found that judicial discretion was necessary to determine whether
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In addition to establishing the Authority that would conduct the licensing
system, define what treatment services, storage and research could be licensed,
and define who should receive the services, HFEA also defined the legal status
of participants in treatment.128 The development of assisted reproductive
technologies has made possible the involvement of many individuals.
Potentially included persons include the sperm donor, the egg or embryo
donor, the woman in whose womb fetal development took place and who gave
birth to the child, the person or persons who initiated the process, and persons
wishing to adopt. With the development of technology came questions about
legal parentage, legitimacy, rights and responsibilities with respect to the child,
and rights of the child to demand care or property. As a result, Parliament, in
HFEA, defined who would be the legal mother and father of children born
through assisted reproduction technology.
The backdrop to determinations of parentage through technology was the
legal notion of legitimacy. At common law, a child was legitimate if born or
conceived when the parents were validly married to each other.129 The
originally harsh doctrine of the legal disabilities of bastards was modified by
allowing subsequent marriages to legitimize children.130 To protect the
legitimacy of the children, the law presumed that the husband was the father
of any child born to his wife during the marriage, or within a human gestation
period thereafter.131 Such presumption was once rebuttable only upon a
showing that the husband's paternity was impossible,132 but section 26 of the
Family Reform Act of 1969 made the presumption rebuttable upon the balance
seeking the truth via a blood test and making the information available, would be in the
interests of the child. Id. at 501-02.
Morgan and Lee note than an amendment requiring the recording of data about
non-identifying information (physical characteristics, family background, education,
skills, health history) was defeated in parliament and that there are authorities who
believe that the desire to know one's genetic parentage is socially constructed.
BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE, supra note 77, at 163-65. Whatever the decision about anonymity
may be, it is important for gamete and embryo donors and others to know whether a
child resulting from their contributions will be able to identify them. Similarly, it is
important for pers6ns seeking treatment services to know whether children they may
have would have access to information about their origins. See Katherine O'Donovan,
What Shall We Tell the Children: Reflections on Children's Perspectives and the Reproductive
Revolution, in BIRTHRIGHTS: LAw AND ETHICS AT THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE 96 (Robert Lee
& Derek Morgan, eds. 1989).
12 8 HFEA § 27-30.
1 2 9 S.M. CRETNEY, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY LAW 564 (3d ed. 1979).
1301d. at 565. Subsequent marriage legitimates children whether it was intended to do
so ornot; "in order to" makes the statement appear to mean that legitimation occurs only
if that is the intended purpose when the parties marry.
1311d. at 570.
13 21d.
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of probability.133 Under this Act, a mother is the woman who gave birth to the
child, and proof of maternity was regarded as a question of fact to be proven
by witnesses attending the childbirth.134
HFEA assigns the legal status of mother to "[t]he woman who is carrying or
has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm
and eggs."13-5 It makes no difference whether the embryo or sperm and eggs
were placed in the woman while she was in the United Kingdom or
elsewhere.136 Although if placed in her outside the United Kingdom, rules
regarding conflicts of law could result in different persons being regarded as
the mother.137
If the woman was married when the embryo or sperm and eggs were placed
in her, or she was inseminated and the sperm was not that of her husband, then
the husband is to be treated as the father unless it is shown that he did not
consent to the placing in his wife of the embryo or sperm and eggs or her
artificial insemination with the donor's sperm.13 8 If the treatment services were
provided to a woman and a man treated together, then he is to be treated as
father.139 The male partner of a defacto couple is treated like the husband of a
couple who are legally married for purposes of determining the paternity of a
child born to the woman during the relationship.140 The male partner
demonstrates consent by accompanying his partner to the treatments, while
the husband may not accompany his wife. Moreover, HFEA does not restrict
treatment services for wives to those who prove their husbands have
consented. It is up to the nonconsenting husband to prove he did not consent
if he does not wish to be treated as the father.141 "Parties to a marriage" for this
purpose, excludes married persons who are judicially separated, but does
include parties to a void marriage if either or both of them reasonably believed
the marriage was valid. 142 Unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed
one of them so believed. 143
133CRETNEY, supra note 129, at 570.
134 P.M. BROMLEY, BROMLEYs FAMILY LAW 256 (6th ed. 1981).
135HFEA § 27(1).
1361d. at § 27(3).
13 7 d. at § 27(3).
1381d. at § 28(2).
139 HFEA at § 28(3).
1401d. This provision applies when unmarried woman and man come together for
treatment.
141 HFEA § 27(7).
142Id. at 28(7).
143Id. at § 28(f)(b).
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By use of the husband's or partner's consent, such man is presumed the
father.144 If the man does not consent, HFEA, section 28(5)(a), preserves the
common law presumption that the mother's husband is the father of her child.
Thus, the husband who succeeds in proving that he did not consent to the
placing in his wife of an embryo or eggs and sperm, or to her insemination by
donor's sperm, must also rebut the common law presumption by proving he
could not be the father.145 That burden may be met today by scientific testing
of blood and DNA. The donor of the sperm may not be treated as the father if
his sperm was used with his consent and in accordance with his consent. 146 If
the mother's husband is not the father and the sperm donor is not the father,
then the child is fatherless.147
A child may also be fatherless under HFEA section 28(6)(b), if "the sperm of
a man, or any embryo the creation of which was brought about with his sperm,
was used after his death."148 This provision is consistent with the suggestion
in the Warnock Report that posthumous parenting should be strongly
discouraged. The Government determined not to prohibit it, but to discourage
it by forbidding inheritance by the posthumous child.149 The HFEA consent
provisions require the person consenting to the storage of gametes or any
embryo to "state what is be done with the gametes or embryo if the person who
gave the consent dies."150 Thus, a husband could consent to his wife's using
his frozen sperm after he dies, but if she does so, he would not be the father of
the resulting child!151 If the couple were in a void marriage, but at least one of
them reasonably believed that it was valid when the child was conceived, that
is, when the embryo was formed, such child would remain legitimate even if
the embryo were frozen and the child were born more than ten months after
the man's death.152 Thus, while the HFEA attempts to resolve some issues of
paternity, it creates other problems and inconsistencies.153
144/d. at § 28(0.
145HFEA § 28(6)(a), sched. 3, 5(1).
146 HEFEA § 28(6)(b) and sched. 3, para. 5 § 1.
14 7Douglas, supra note 75, at 112; Derek Morgan, HIF & E Bill: The Status Provisions,
1990 J. OF SOC. WELFARE 120.
148HFEA § 28(6)(b).
149DouCLAs, supra note 75, at 111. Because the HFEA limits storage of gametes to 10
years, fears of indefinite delays in probate or impossible perpetuities violations would
be minimized. HFEA § 14(3).
1501d. at sched. 3 para. 2, § 2(b).
1511d. at § 28(6)(b).
152BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE, supra note 77, at 156-59. See Legitimacy Act 1976 1(1) as
modified by the Family Law Reform Act 1987, § 28(4).
153 0ne problem which was foreseen and circumvented was the devolution of titles
of honor and property accompanying such titles. Determinations of maternity and
paternity under FIFEA § 27 and § 28 do not affect succession to titles, which would
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HFEA did not adopt such explicit provisions concerning who is the mother
and father of a child born to a surrogate. In the Surrogacy Arrangements Act
of 1985, Parliament prohibited negotiating or initiating commercial surrogacy
contracts. That Act was amended by HIFEA, section 36(1), which provided that
surrogacy arrangements would not be enforceable.154
Surrogacy continued, however, to provoke continuing debates about the
new forms of parenting.155 One commentator has argued that a"[r]eproductive
technology has become the bureau de change of the moral economy" and that
surrogacy represents a challenge to the way in which societies respond to the
re-evaluation of the currency of personhood which technology has forced upon
it."156 Commentators wondered whether legal recognition of parental
responsibilities were based upon the welfare of the child or the benefits to the
parent(s), and whether recognition of only one person of each sex as a parent
was consistent with the contemporary experience of parenting. 157
The HFEA created the possibility of a court's issuing an order declaring that
a child be treated as the child of the parties to a marriage if (1) the child was
carried by a woman other than the wife as the result of the placing in her of an
embryo or sperm and eggs or of artificial insemination by a donor and the
gametes of husband or wife or both were used, (2) both husband and wife apply
for the order within six months of the child's birth, (3) at the time of the
application the child is living with them and either or both of them are
domiciled in the United Kingdom, (4) both husband and wife have attained
the age of 18, (5) the father of the child, where he is not the husband, and the
woman who carried the child freely and with full understanding
unconditionally agree to the order (unless such person cannot be found), and
(7) the court finds that no money has changed hands in exchange for handing
continue to follow blood (genetic) lines. HFEA § 29(4). Laws regarding incest and
prohibited degrees of marriage would also follow legal, rather than genetic parentage.
BLACK.sToNE's GUIDE, supra note 77, at 160-61, DOUGLAS, supra note 75, at 112. Because
of the ten year limit imposed byHFEA section 14(3) an unforeseen problem was freezing
sperm of a young man likely to become infertile. However, the Human Fertilization and
Embryology (Statutory Storage Period) Regulations 1991 (SI 1991/1540) extend the ten
year period for up to 39 years if the man is aged 16 or under and up to 11 years if he is
aged 44. DOUGLAS, supra note 75, at 350.
154HFEA § 36(1).
155HFEA §§ 30(1)-(7).
156Derek Morgan, Who Is to Be or Not to Be: The Surrogacy Story, 49 MOD. L. REV. 358,
368 (1986). He noted elsewhere that surrogacy has become "the eye of the storm
surrounding assisted reproduction" and "the whipping post for the moral backlash
against what is seen as the brave new world of technological rationality and scientific
finality." Derek Morgan, Surrogacy: Giving it an Understood Name, 1988 J. OF SOC.
WELFARE 216. SeealsoJonathan Montgomery, Constructinga FamilyAftera Surrogate Birth,
49 MOD. L. REv. 635 (1986) (using a genetic-gestational or functional definition of family.
157 See J. G. Hogg, Surrogacy---Nobody's Child: Consequences of the HFEA 1990,21 FAM.
L. 276, 276-78 (1991), and Jennifer Craven-Griffiths, New Families For Old: Have the
Statutes Caught Up With Reality?, 21 FAM. L. 326, 326-30 (1991).
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over the child or making the order.158 These orders, known as Section 30 orders,
would allow a married couple who were raising a child handed over to them
by the woman who carried and gave birth to it, to be recognized as parents of
the child who was related genetically to at least one of them.
In its Draft Circular to Local Authorities of February 18, 1994, the
Department of Health outlined how Section 30 orders could work. Under the
rules of the Family Proceedings Courts, the court would appoint a guardian ad
litem for the child. The guardian could receive information from the licensed
treatment center to determine whether there had been a placing of an embryo
or sperm and eggs or artificial insemination by the donor and whether gametes
of the husband or wife had been used.159 The Human Fertilization and
Embryology (Disclosure of Information) Act of 1992 had amended HFEA
Section 33(6) to provide explicitly that such information could be made
available to a court in an application for a Section 30 order. The guardian would
also determine whether the other Section 30 orders were met and whether
issuance of the Section 30 order would be in the child's welfare, which always
must be the court's paramount consideration in determining any issue
concerning a child's upbringing. 160 Some investigation should already have
taken place as treatment services are not to be provided until the licensed
treatment center determines that assisted reproduction would be for the
welfare of any child born from the services and any other child who may be
affected. 161 The guardian would also determine that the woman who carried
and gave birth to the child knowingly and voluntarily agreed to turn over the
child to the couple. The carrying woman can not give valid consent for such a
transfer until six weeks after the birth of the child. 162
While Parliament provided some answers to questions that had arisen
concerning who should receive treatment services and the legal relationships
of various participants, significant policy choices remained undetermined. No
limits were placed upon the number of children who might be born from a
single donor's sperm or eggs. No limits were placed upon the use of relatives,
including close relatives, as gamete donors or surrogate mothers. Moreover, no
limits were placed upon the number of fertilized eggs or embryos which could
be placed within a woman, nor was there any mention of selective reduction
of multiple pregnancies. Finally, no decisions were made concerning provision
of treatment services to the indigent.163
158HFEA § 30(1)- (7).
159HFEA § 13(5).
160Children Act 1989 § 1(1).
161HFEA § 13(5).
162Department of Health, DRAFr CIRCULAR TO LOCAL AuTHORITIES § 30 (Feb. 18,
1994)(as provided to author).
163Jennifer Gunning & Veronica English, Report from the Interim Voluntary Licensing
Authority, DARTMOUTH GowER 69 (1993). The Voluntary Licensing Authority existed
from 1985 until the HFEA went into force in 1991; it provided guidance and direction
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These and other particular issues remain within the broader ethical, social,
political and religious context. Athena Liu applauds HFEA for its recognition
of the need for social regulation of modem reproductive technologies, while
also recognizing the social and psychological experience of infertility and the
limited utility of the language of rights to provide adequate answers.164 The
right of a woman to reproductive freedom and control is related to issues of
population size and density, compulsory sterilization, bearing or adopting or
parenting a child, and the need to involve others in the exercise of one's
rights.165
IV. CONCLUSION
Decisions concerning parenting are not simply personal or private decisions
but also public and political decisions. Who can effectively exercise
reproductive choice depends upon the availability of wages, child care, decent
housing, and services required for successful child raising.166 At the same time,
as the development of technology is accompanied by increasing governmental
control and regulation, the state becomes ever more implicated in the intimate
contours of marriage and family life.167
While medical and technological developments continue to change our
understanding of human reproductive processes, which in turn affects our
understanding of parenting and parenthood, it remains a challenge to express
experience and change in the law. In the United States, model acts have been
proposed.168 As was indicated at the beginning, however, federal legislation is
quite limited in scope, and is of recent origin. In addition, state legislative efforts
have been few and recent. 169
while the Government was developing the HFEA.
164ATHENA LIu, ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS 1-2 (1991).
165Id. at 24-25.
166VIVIEN SEAL, WHOSE CHOICE? WORKING CLASS WOMEN AND THE CONTROL OF
FERTILITY (1990). As Derek Morgan has indicated in his discussion of surrogacy, the
development of new reproductive technologies has forced reconsideration not only of
the relationship of the personal and the political (one of the major contributions of
feminist jurisprudence) but also of the way in which society assigns and values women's
work. Derek Morgan, Who To Be orNot To Be: The Surrogacy Story, 49 MOD. L. REV. 367-68
(1986).
167BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE, supra note 77, at 2-3. The authors caution that the ideological
dimensions of technological change are "concealed behind cloaks of scientific objectivity
and moral neutrality." Id. at 2.
168UNIFORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 93 U.L.A. 152 (Supp.
1994). See Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act: A View from the Drafting
Committee, 13 NOVA L. REV. 491 (1989); Model Human Reproductive Technologies and
Surrogacy Act, 72 IOWA L. REV. 943 (1987).
169Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-156 -20-165 (Michie Supp. 1994)) and North Dakota
(N.D. Cent. Code §§ 14-18-01 - 14-18-07 (1991)) adopted the Uniform Status of Children
of Assisted Conception Act. New Hampshire adopted legislation in 1990 (N.H. REV.
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Several features of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act of 1990
offer guidance to states attempting to formulate laws. Legislative resolution
appears preferable to having judges make decisions as to when issues arise in
divorce, property, probate, contract, support and parentage.
In the United Kingdom, the initial efforts were studies, such as the Warnock
Report discussed above, as well as reports from religious, medical, social and
advocacy groups. From such studies, Parliament adopted the fourteen-day
time limit for embryo research and implantation. The choice of the
fourteen-day marker was rooted in biological processes of development. There
was no attempt to divide the continuum of development into discrete moments
(e.g. "moment of conception," "moment of fertilization," "implantation"), when
in fact each of these events occurs over time.170
It was also determined, in the United Kingdom, that research on fertilization
and on embryos must complement treatment services for infertility. The
development of new reproductive technologies came about through the typical
process of change in medicine which involves both research and patient care.
Both dimensions of the process must be present for the result to be human and
humane. The individual experiencing infertility, the intending parents, the
gamete donors, and the resulting child(ren) must be recognized in their fully
human reality, not only in their biological reality. One step in that direction is
the recognition in HFEA of who is defined as mother and father to the child.
Participants know from the outset which legal relationships will be established.
Finally, the establishment of one Authority to set up licensing of practitioners
and clinics, to promulgate a code of practice and regulations, and to compile
data on procedures and results, brings unity to widespread efforts by many
individuals who became involved in assisted reproduction. While extra legal
efforts will continue to take place, the benefits offered to those who operate
within the licensing framework will attract more and more practitioners into
conformity with the law. The gathering of data to be presented to the
STAT. ANN. 168-B:1 to B:31 (1990)). These statutes treat surrogacy like adoption: if the
court finds the intending parents are suitable, the surrogacy contract is approved and
the intending parents will be the legal parents of the child unless a surrogate who has
provided the egg terminates the contract within 180 days of insemination.
170The 14-day limit for research on embryos was recently proposed in the United
States by the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel, a 19-member advisory commission
appointed by Health and Human Services Secretary Donna Shalala. Dr. Harold Varmus,
Director of the National Institutes of Health, will draw up final guidelines. Natalie
Angler, Rules Due On Disputed Embryo Research, NEw YORK TIMEs, Sept. 6, 1994 at B4.
The Secretary was authorized to appoint the panel by the NIH Revitalization Act of
1993. Supra note 7. Prior regulations had prohibited embryo research unless reviewed
by an Ethical Advisory Board (which had never been appointed). Under the new law
the Secretary may not withhold funds because of ethical considerations until receipt of
a recommendation from an ethics advisory board. A challenge to the Panel's making
recommendations was rejected on grounds that the petitioners lacked standing. Doe v.
Shalala, 862 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Md. 1994). See OPRR Reports Number 94-03, In Vitro
Fertilization of Human Ova, NATIONAL INSTITUrES OF HEALTH, July 22,1994,45 C.F.R. § 45
(1994).
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government and to Parliament will provide an ongoing opportunity to
evaluate and, if necessary, redirect the developing technology.171
What the United Kingdom might discover from the experience in the United
States is that surrogacy need not be the exploitative procedure which might be
found in media presentations. In In re Baby M,172 the court denied enforcement
of a surrogacy contract when the genetic and gestational mother refused to
terminate her parental rights. The matter was resolved under the usual 'best
interests of the child" criteria and the genetic father (by artificial
insemination-donor) was awarded physical custody.173 California, in the first
surrogacy case to reach its appellate court, upheld a surrogacy contract after
both parties had performed. The surrogate, who was also the genetic mother,
gave birth and delivered the child to the intending parents, and then attempted
to change her mind eight months after signing her consent to the adoption by
the genetic father's wife.174
Surrogacy situations do continue to present awkward statutory construction
problems. For example, California resolved a conflict between genetic parents
and the gestational mother by finding that although both women were
"mothers" under California law (which recognized giving birth and blood tests
as proof of maternity), the "best interests of the child" would be recognition of
the genetic parents as the legal parents.175
In a similar situation, New York determined that the genetic father could
establish paternity via blood tests while the genetic mother would have to
1711n its Third Annual Report (covering November 1992 through October 1993) the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority listed three social and ethical issues
which had been considered: (1) embryo freezing for treatment and research, (2) use of
donated ovarian tissue in embryo research and treatment (see Human Fertilization and
Embryology Authority, Donated Ovarian Tissue in Embryo Research and Assisted
Conception Report, (1994)), and (3) oncology patients, especially young men. Human
Fertilization and Embryology Authority, Third Annual Report at § 3.1 (1994). For the
coming year issues to be considered include: (1) oocyte freezing, (2) improved methods
of ongoing inspection of licensed centers for treatment, storage and research, (3)
payment for sperm and egg donors, (4) academic follow-up studies on children born
from assisted reproduction, and (5) dealing with low success rates and comparative
success rates at various licensed centers. Id. at § 8.1.
172537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
173Id. at 1277. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)
where in a similar situation recognition of the genetic father and the surrogate genetic
mother as the legal parents did not appear to be in the child's best interests.
174In re Adoption of B.M., 284 Cal. Rptr. 18 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1685 (1992).
175Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 494 cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993). In a
situation hypothesized in Johnson of a true egg donor, where the wife was the gestational
mother of a child whose genetic father was her husband and the genetic mother was an
anonymous egg donor, New York held that the husband in a divorce action could not
denyhis wife's parenthood of thechild. McDonaldv. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App.
Div. 1994).
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adopt the child who was presumed the child of the gestational mother.176 In
Virginia, a decision terminating the rights of the gestational mother in favor of
the genetic father and mother was reversed upon request of the appointed
guardian ad litein who wanted more time to protect the infant's constitutional
rights. 177
In the end, there remain the inextricably intertwined issues of law, medicine
and ethics. Reproductive technologies raise questions at the beginning of
individual human lives:
If the desire to bear a child is biological, is it unnatural to oppose it?
If the desire [to bear a child] is social, is opposition to artificial means
to realize it an interference with liberty?
If the desire [to bear a child] is a reflection of God's purpose, should
we use even unnatural methods to advance it?
Or did that God intend that we should accept ourselves for what we
are?1
78
As was indicated by the Archbishop of York in the Parliamentary debates on
HFEA, in discussing what happens within society as these issues are debated
and resolved, the continuing and underlying issue is "what are we doing to
ourselves and to our own respect for human life if we fail to be sensitive to
something so intimately bound up with our personal origins?"179
1761n re A Paternity Proceeding under Article 5 of the Family Court Act, 591 N.Y.S.2d
946 (Fam. Ct. 1992).
177Baby Doe v. John and Mary Doe and Richard and Jane Roe, 421 S.E.2d 913 (Va. Ct.
App. 1992).
178CRRENT STATUrES ANNOTATED, Ch. 37, HFEA, 37-3 (Street & Maxwell 1990).
1791d. at 37-7.
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